Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.| FTC Files Amicus Brief - Asks federal court to consider banks as “debt collectors” under the FDCPA

H/T Lexology No. 14-14200

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Keith Davidson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., Defendant-Appellee, On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Georgia No. 1:13-cv-2307 Hon. William S. Duffy, Jr.   Amicus Brief of the Federal Trade Commission Supporting Rehearing En Banc ______________________________________________ JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN General Counsel JOEL MARCUS Director of Litigation THEODORE (JACK) METZLER Attorney Federal Trade Commission 600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20580 (202) 326-3502 (202) 326-2477 (fax) STATEMENT OF ISSUE MERITING EN BANC CONSIDERATION Whether the panel correctly held, in conflict with every other court of appeals that has considered the issue, that a person who regularly acquires debts that are in default and attempts to collect on them does not qualify as a “debt collector” within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. [...] STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case concerns who qualifies as a “debt collector” subject to FDCPA requirements vital to protecting consumers from abuse. If a person collecting a debt is not a “debt collector,” he is not subject to the statute. The panel held that a company that buys debts that are already in default is not a debt collector. That decision squarely conflicts with (and does not acknowledge) the decisions of four other courts of appeals—the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits—that have directly addressed the same question. No court of appeals before now has reached the panel’s conclusion. The panel misinterpreted the statute, resulting in a construction of the FDCPA that is both under- and overinclusive. It created an irrational loophole in the FDCPA that enables unscrupulous debt collectors to avoid its requirements. And it removed an important exception to the statute, which ironically extends the FDCPA’s strictures to companies that Congress did not intend the statute to cover.