WASH Supr Ct | Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc. || The Court therefore reversed in part and remanded for trial . . . "....a trustee could not rely on a beneficiary declaration containing such ambiguous **alternative** language. ...."

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

ROCIO TRUJILLO, Petitioner, v. NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES, INC., Respondent; WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, Defendant. GORDON McCLOUD, J.- Rocio Trujillo's home loan was secured by a deed of trust encumbering the home. She defaulted, and Northwest Trustee Services Inc. (NWTS), the successor trustee, sent a notice of default and scheduled a trustee's sale of her property. Under the deeds of trust act (DTA), a trustee may not initiate such a nonjudicial foreclosure without "proof that the beneficiary [of the deed of trust] is the owner of any promissory note ... secured by the deed of trust." RCW 61.24.030(7)(a) (emphasis added). But the very next sentence of that statute says, "A declaration by the beneficiary made under the penalty of perjury stating that the beneficiary is the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation secured by the deed of trust shall be sufficient proof as required under this subsection." Id. (emphasis added). NWTS had a beneficiary declaration from Wells Fargo Banlc It did not contain that specific statutory language. Instead, it stated under penalty of perjury, "Wells Fargo Banlc, NA is the actual holder of the promissory note . . . or has requisite authority under RCW 62A.3-301 to enforce said [note]." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 36 (emphasis added). This declaration language differs from the language ofRCW 61.24.030(7)(a), quoted above, by adding the "or" alternative. Following our recent decision in Lyons v. U.S. Bank National Ass 'n, 181 Wn.2d 775, 336 P.3d 1142 (2014), we hold that a trustee cannot rely on a beneficiary declaration containing such ambiguous alternative language. Trujillo therefore alleged facts sufficient to show that NWTS breached the DT A and also to show that that breach could support the elements of a Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim. Ch. 19.86 RCW. However, her allegations do not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or criminal profiteering. We therefore reverse in part and remand for trial.